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CoNFLICT oF LAws-REFUGEE GoVERNMENT 1 PROPERTY CoNSERVATION DECREES IN THE CouRTS OF THE UNITED STATES - The
histo:r:ical setting for the present discussion has been concisely set forth
by Justice Shientag in a leading case: 2
"On May 10, I 940, the territory, of the Netherlands in
Europe was invaded by Germany and thereafter was occupied
by and has since then remained under the hostile occupation of the
German military forces. The Royal Netherlands Government,
in order to .carry on the functions of government free of German

1 Oppenheimer, "Governments and Authorities in Exile," 36 AM. J. INT. L.
568, note (1942), criticizes the term "refugee" or "exiled." "The term 'exiled' or
'refugee' government-although well-known today-is not very appropriate since it
does not express clearly that such government is the only de fure sovereign power of
the country, the territory of which is under belligerent occupation, but no better term
has yet -been coined. 'Authority' is used in the English war legislation as referring to
the Free French." This very readable article is recommended.
Se~ also various articles on legislation in exile, 24 J. CoMP. LEG. & INT. L. 57
(Poland), 120 (Czechoslovakia), 125 (Norway) (1942). ·
2 Anderson v. N. V. Transandine Handelmaatschappij, (Sup. Ct. N. Y. County,
May 22, 1941) 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 547 at 550.
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domination, thereafter moved from The Hague in the Netherlands to London, England. The Government of the United
States continues to recognize this government as the government
of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and this government is also
so recognized by the British Government. . . .
"In order to prevent the foreign resources of Netherlands
companies and of 1'fetherlands individuals, domiciled in the occupied territory of the Netherlands, from being used by the enemy
of the Netherlands, the Netherlands Government took certain
protective measures. The first and basic step in this program was
the adoption of the Netherlands Royal Decree of May 24, 1940.8
The Royal Decree vested in the State of Netherlands title to
assets such as here sought to be attached, namely, cash accounts
and securities belonging to natural and legal persons domiciled
in the occupied territory of the Netherlands and deposited with
American corporations and firms."
Does such a decree have any operative effect in the United States? 4
If so, what is the scope of operation?-to what extent is it effective to
vest title in the state of The Netherlands? The first question was answered affirmatively in Anderson v. N. V. Transandine Handelmaatschapij. 5 In that case, a damage action was brought by Anderson, a
resident of the state of New York, against the defendant Netherlands
corporation, and certain subjects of the Netherlands. The corporation
and the individuals were domiciled in the Netherlands at the time of
the German occupation, and have remained there domiciled. The
court was careful to point out that although the plaintiff was a resident
of New York, he was what is commonly known as an assignee for
collection; the alleged assignment having been made solely for the
purpose of making him, instead of his assignor, the plaintiff in this
action. The plaintiff's assignor was a nonresident alien, a citizen of a
country of Europe, and understood to be then resident in Cuba. It
also should be noted that the alleged cause of action arose outside the
United States. The complaint alleged that the plaintiff's assignor had
8 The decree is set forth in 3 C. C.H., WAR LAW SERVICE, "Foreign Supplement," 1f 67,150. It is to be noted that "proprietary rights vested in the state of
The Netherlands, by virtue of the preceding paragraphs, shall only be exercised for
the conservation of the rights of the former owners." The courts please to refer to it
as a "conservatory'' rather than a "confiscatory'' decree.
4 Questions of Dutch constitutional law have been considered supra, p. 644 ff., by
Landheer, "The Legal Status of the Netherlands."
5 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. County, May 22, (1941) 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 547, noted 19
N. Y. UNIV. L. Q. REv. 71 (1941), affirmed 263 App. Div. 705, 31 N. Y. S. (2d)
194 (Nov. 14, 1941); motion to appeal granted, 263 App. Div. 858, 32 N. Y. S.
(2d) 1014 (Jan. 16, 1942), affd. 289 N. Y. 9, 43 N. E. (2d) 502 (July 29, 1942).
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deposited cash and securities with the defendants in the Netherlands;
that he had demanded thejr return prior to the invasion of the Neth, erlands; that the defendant failed to return them.
Subsequent to the promulgation of the Netherlands decree, the
plaintiff attached property of the defendants in a New York depositary,
and the defendants, appearing specially, moved to vacate the attachment on the ground that the property sought to be attached belonged
to the state of The Netherlands; the state of The Netherlands intervened specially for the purpose of moving to vacate the attachment on
the same ground. The Supreme Court, New Yark County, granted
the motion to vacate the attachment.
The first question that confronted the court was whether promulgation of the decree at London, England instead of at The Hague
rendered it invalid. Associated with this geographical question is the
further_ complication that the offices and personnel of the refugee government in England differed from that of the former The Hague
government. 5 a That is, is this decree an act of the state of The Netherlands? The court cites Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States/ and
quotes therefrom: "What government is to be regarded here as representative of a foreign sovereign state is a political rather than a judicial
question, and is to be determined by the political department of the
government." From this, the court reasons that, "The circumstance
that the Royal Netherlands Decree of May 24, I 940, was promulgated
in London, England, rather than at The Hague, is immaterial, in view
of the fact that our government has officially recognized the Netherlands Government since its temporary residence in London." 1
Assuming the decree to be a valid exercise of the sovereign power
of the Netherlands, and that it covers the property here sought to be
attached, is it operative in the courts of the United States? On this
point, the court said that a right acquired under foreign law is, by
comity, recognized and enforced by our courts unless against the public
policy of the forum. 8 It cited the Belmont case 9 as authority for the
proposition that a confiscatory decree of a foreign government operating upon property in this country belonging to its nationals is not
opposed to the public policy of this country nor of the state of New
York.
The legal arguments do not tell the whole story; the case also has
5

See Landheer, "The Legal Status of the Netherlands," supra, at pp. 646-647.
304 U.S. 126 at 137, 58 S. Ct. 785 (1<>38).
7
28 N. Y. S. (2d) 547 at 551-552.
8
Generally, on the propositions embraced in the two foregoing paragraphs, see
annotations: 37 A. L. R. 726 (1925); 41 A. L. R. 745 (1925); 65 A. L. R. 1494
(1930); 139 A.L.R. 1209 (1942).
9
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 57 S. Ct. 758 (1937).
0

a
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a practical, nonlegal aspect. The purpose of the decree is to prevent
Germany from siphoning the holdings of Netherlands corporations and
individuals, domiciled in the occupied territory, which holdings are
outside the occupied territory. How is this property to be conserved
for the benefit of the rightful owners, and prevented from falling into
German hands as an aid to their war effort? 10 The court said,
". . . If the title of the Netherlands Government under the
Decree is superior to such claims [ those of nonresident aliens
based on a foreign cause of action], Netherlands assets in the
United States are protected. If the contrary is held, then American courts will be made the forum for the determination of much
of the litigation of a war-torn world and the assets of Netherlands
nationals here will be one of the important stakes sought." 11
The court clearly reserved the question of the right of a citizen of
the United States, acting for himself, to attach property covered by the
Netherlands decree. In the Court of Appeals, the Attorney General
of the United States submitted a statement of policy prepared by the
State Department.12 This statement likewise was limited to the policy
involved in the instant case. If the so-called practical argument motivated the court to subordinate the claim of the nonresident alien based
on a foreign cause of action, it is submitted that there is an indication
in the case that the claim of a United States citizen or a resident alien
based on a cause of action arising in this country might call for a different result. The supreme court said:
"If this claimant's assignor is recognized as having a right
superior to that of the State of the Netherlands under the decree,
10

Query: Is the danger of siphoning assets from this country belonging to persons domiciled in occupied territory a real one in view of the United States "freezing
orders"? See Executive Order No. 8389 set forth in 12 U.S. C. (Supp. 1941), § 95,
note, and I C. C. H., WAR LAW SERVICE, "Statutes," U 14,351.
11
28 N. Y. S. (2d) 547 at 558.
12
289 N. Y. 9, 43 N. E. (2d) 502 (July 29, 1942); 36 AM. J. INT. L.
651 (1942).
German orders in the Netherlands have been denied operative effect by our
courts. Koninklijke Lederfabriek "Oisterwijp" N. V. v. Chase National Bank of New
York, 177 Misc. 186, 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 518 (Sept. 26, 1941) affd. 263 App. Div.
815, 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 131 (Dec. 19, 1941) motion for leave to appeal denied 263
App. Div. 857, 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 784 (Jan. 16, 1942); Amstelbank, N. V. v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 177 Misc. 548, 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 194 (Nov. 28, 1941);
Van Der Veen v. Amsterdamsche Bank, 178 Misc. 668, 35 N. Y. S. (2d) 945 (June
22, 1942).
In the Koninklijke case the court expresses the opinion that the defendant bank
would not be subjected to double liability should it be adjudicated that it pay over
the balance to the present plaintiff, and should it happen that ultimately recognition
be accorded the present de facto German government of the Netherlands territory in
Europe.
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then there is nothing to prevent any other alien, including alien
enemies of the Netherlands who may have real or fancied grievances based upon transactions abroad with Netherlands nationals,
from assigning their claims to New York residents for collection.
How will a court be able to judge whether the testimony given
or the affidavits furnished by pers.9ns in the occupied territory
represent the true state of affairs or are statements and admissions
wrung from a reluctant person by force and duress? There is the
possibility of preference and discrimination, the possibility of
judgment on the basis of inadequate facts, and, finally, the possibility that the American-held assets of Netherlands companies and
individuals will be so dissipated that the purposes of the Netherlands Decree for a fair restitution at the close of the war will be
completely frustrated." 13

In a suit by a United States citizen, or a resident alien, acting in his
own right, to attach property covered by a refugee government decree,
the court may judge the facts as well as it can in any normal American
case. The probabilities of coercion and duress by Germany are
eliminated.
.
Koninklijke Lederfabriek Oisterwijk N. V. v. Chase National Bank
of New York, 14 and Amstelbank, N. V. v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New
York 15 direct our attention to another Netherlands decree. In anticipation of the German invasion, the Netherlands Parliament enacted a
law authorizing Netherlands c9rporations to change their "seat"
( which the court says apparently means more than principal office, and
seems to be substantially in the nature of domicile) from the territory
of the Netherlands in Europe to other Netherlands territory. In etch
of these cases, the plaintiff corporation took the prescribed steps for
effecting such a change. On June 7, 1940, in order to protect Netherlands assets abroad from being used for the benefit of the invading
forces through duress ·exercised on persons in the occupied area, the
Netherlands Government in London promulgated a decree which
. purports to make null and void any claim or instruction emanating
from occupied territory of the Netherlands respecting assets of Netherlands corporations outside such territory.
In each of these cases, the plaintiff was a Netherlands corporation
which had changed its seat, suing to r-ecover the balance of a bank
deposit. In each case, the c;lefendant filed a motion for an order pursuant to the New York Civil Practice Act, section 5 r-a, permitting it
28 N. Y. S. (2d) 547 at 558.
177 Misc. 186, 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 518 (Sept. 26, 1941), affd. 263 App. Div.
815, 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 131 (Dec. 19, 1941), motion for leave to appeal denied 263
App. Div. 857, 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 784 (Jan. 16, 1942). ·
15 177 Misc. 548, 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 194 (Nov. 28, 1941).
18

14
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to give notice to an alleged adverse claimant to the balance. Both
alleged adverse claims emanated from occupied Netherlands territory.
In the Koninklijke case the communication was from a "fiduciary" of
defendant's depositor appointed as such by the Commissioner of the
Reich for the occupied territory; in the Amstelbank case, the claim was
evidenced by a letter from the corporation in the occupied territory
and one from the "Beheerder'' appointed by the Germans. In each case
the motion was denied. The court, however, was not called upon to
decide whether the plaintiff's claim was valid.
The Amstelbank case made an interesting commentary on the attitude of the courts toward these legal conflicts between the refugee
government and the invader:
"In approaching the decision of this motion, the existence of
certain factors must be acknowledged. If this court should decide
that a mere notice emanating from a person in German occupied
territory, where individuals are completely under the control of
the invading force, constitutes a claim under Section 51 -a, there
would be placed in the hands of the invader an effective means to
block individuals and corporations otherwise entitled thereto from
obtaining their property in this country. By thus tying up the
funds or property for at least a year, another facility for practicing
duress and oppression would be placed at the disposal of those
who have demonstrated their resourcefulness along those lines.
If possible then, a determination should be reached which would
avoid such a palpable injustice, and also be consistent with our
laws." 16
Although not a refugee government in the same sense as those
functioning in London, the French government has promulgated confiscatory decrees 11 more or less similar. Two decisions are set forth
without comment.
In the Feuchtwanger case,18 a French government decree of April
24, 1940, as amended May 10, 1940, defined as prohibited exportation
of capital "the acts of allowing to remain outside of French territory,
or keeping in foreign exchange or foreign currencies, or of not collecting within the territories fixed by decree or instruction of the
Minister of Finance, all or part of the proceeds of the exportation of
merchandise, or of the remuneration for services, as well as all or part
of all proceeds or income abroad."
16

Id., 31 N. Y. S. (2d) at 197-198.
For text of decree, see 3 C. C.H., WAR LAw SERVICE, "Foreign Supplement,"
U67,099.
,
18
Feuchtwanger v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term,
N. Y. County, May 12, 1941) 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 518.
17
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In May 1939, plaintiff, then a resident of France, purchased a
number of United States Federal Reserve Notes in Canada, and directed that they be transferred to defendant Banque J ordaan, a French
banking corporation. J ordaan directed that they be transmitted to
defendant Hanover for deposit to J ordaan's credit. When the plaintiff
learned of this, he brought this action to impress the deposit with a
trust in his favor. In June, 1940, the plaintiff :fled from France, and
was residing in this country at the time of _the litigation. Hanover
pleaded that the decree of the French government prohibited a recovery by the plaintiff.
The court construed the decree set forth above to be inapplicable
to the plaintiff's bank notes, but said:
"Even if it be assumed that the French decrees did purport
to make it unlawful for the plaintiff to hold foreign currency
abroad, they cannot be given extraterritorial effect. The Federal
Reserve notes were either in Canada or in the United States at all
times since the enactment of these French decrees; and they were
the property of the plaintiff under the laws of Canada and the
United States during that entire period. The French decrees
could not validly operate to prevent Canadian or United States
banks holding the plaintiff's funds from turning them over to him,
regardless of what crimes, if any, plaintiff may be guilty of under
French law." 19
The case was affirmed (in the Appellate Division) 20 and Hanover
appealed on the ground that the case was not a proper one for exercise
of jurisdiction in rem by way of constructive service, on the absent
Banque Jordaan. The Court of Appeals also affirmed. 21
In the Bollack case,22 the complaint alleged that on January 16,
1940, the plaintiff caused to be delivered to the defendant, a French
corporation doing business in the state of New York, various securities,
and that after a number of prior demands, the defendant on March 19,
1941 expressly repudiated the agreement of bailment and refused to
act upon any instructions from the plaintiff with respect to the securities
or any part of them. It was further alleged that there had been a
wrongful detainer, and the plaintiff demanded the value of the securities plus damages for the detention.
The answer admitted that the securities were delivered and that
Id. at 521-522.
31 N. Y. S. (2d) 671 (1941).
21 288 N. Y. 342, 43 N. E. (2d) 434 (July 29, 1942).
22 Bollack v. Societe Generale pur Favoriser le Development du Commerce et de
l'lndustrie en France, 177 Misc. 136, 30 N; Y. S. (2d) 83 (Sept. 3, 1941), reversed
263 App. Div. 601, 33 N. Y. S. (2d) 986 (Mar. 27, 1942).
19

20
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they were to be held for the account of the plaintiff subject to his
exclusive direction and control. An affirmative defense was set up,
pleading that on October 29, I 940, the plaintiff was a national and
citizen of France and as such he was deprived of his French nationality
by a decree of the French Government duly enacted on or about
October 29, 1940, which decree confiscated the assets of the plaintiff
including the securities specified in the complaint. The Supreme Court,
Special Term,28 denied the motion to strike the affirmative defense.
On appeal, 24 a motion to strike this defense was granted on the
ground that it is against the public policy of the state of New York to
enforce foreign confiscatory decrees. The court distinguished this case
from the Russian cases,25 on the ground that here the public policy of
the state of New York did not collide with federal policy. Not only is
the decree arbitrary and confiscatory, but it is also penal ( state courts
do not give effect to the penal statutes and decrees of other states) and
ex post facto. Neither the Feuchtwanger case nor the cases of the
refugee government conservatory decrees were cited or discussed.
Although this discussion does not purport to treat the English cases
involving the decrees of refugee governments,26 but only the American
ones, a complete discussion necessitates the inclusion of Lorentzen v.
Lyddon & Co. 21 There the Anderson case 28 was not only cited as authority for the decision, but favorably quoted at length and commented
upon. A decree of the refugee Norwegian government requisitioned
all ships registered in Norway or belonging to a port there and situated
outside the area in Norway occupied by an enemy power and which
are owned by· persons or companies carrying on business there. The
decree also appointed a curator of all assets outside the occupied areas
to the exclusion of the right of the owner in the occupied territory.
It was held that by operation of the refugee government decree the
curator could sue in England on a contract claim of a shipowner in the
occupied territory.
Robert D. Ulrich
177 Misc. 136, 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 83 (Sept. 3, 1941).
263 App. Div. 601, 33 N. Y. S. (2d) 986 (Mar. 27, 1942).
25 See 33 N. Y. S. (2d) at 989 for citations and discussion.
26 For a scholarly discussion of the English cases, see Lachs, "Allied Governments
in Exile; The Effect of Allied Legislation in Britain," 92 L. J. 275 (1942).
27 (K. B. Dec. 2, 1941) 71 Lloyd's List L. R. 197. See also Re Amand, (1942]
I All. Eng. Rep. Ann. 236.
28 Anderson v. N. V. Transandine Handelmaatschappij, (Sup. Ct. N. Y. County,
May 22, 1941) 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 547.
23

24

